Weapons: Combat Robots

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October 13, 2025: Over the past twenty years, small unmanned ground-based robots have undergone tremendous evolution. Initially, there was RoBattle, a seven-ton wheeled modular drone transport vehicle capable of carrying three tons of cargo. This innovative Israeli concept, however, never entered service.

The PackBot 510 entered service in 2002. It operates on tracks and can climb stairs, navigate through rubble, mud, snow, and more. Weighing 24 kg, it includes accessories like cable cutters, a hook, and the ability to probe for and remove buried obstacles. Battery-operated, this tracked drone can function for four hours on a single charge. It is operated remotely via a wireless link using a touchscreen tablet controller. The PackBot 510 remains in service with several countries.

The similar but smaller 13 kg XM1216 SUGV also operates on tracks and can carry 2.7 kg of accessories. Its capabilities mirror those of the PackBot 510.

The Talon, a 27–45 kg drone, operates similarly to the PackBot and SUGV but boasts additional capabilities. Entering service in 2000, it was primarily used to disable roadside bombs and other explosive devices. A combat version is armed with a 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun to provide protective fire for infantry. It can also operate a 12.7 mm sniper rifle, a 40 mm grenade launcher, and several other weapons. The lighter reconnaissance version can be equipped with chemical, temperature, and radiation sensors. It has an eight-hour operational life between recharges of its lithium-ion batteries and is controlled remotely using a game-style controller. The operator can be up to 1,200 meters from the robot, and day/night color cameras provide sufficient detail to guide the drone over rubble and into wreckage. The Talon was used during the recovery effort after the 2001 Islamic terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York City. Costing up to $6 million each, Talons remain in service.

Between 2004 and 2007, over 6,000 ground drones were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Most were small, under 25 kg, and used to check for roadside bombs and lead searches into buildings and caves suspected of enemy activity.

In 2025, Ukraine equipped its combat brigades with ground-based combat and transport robots alongside aerial drones. These ground robots come in various versions. Some are used for planting and removing landmines, while others advance along the ground, firing remotely controlled machine guns. These systems can accurately target moving objects day or night. Additionally, drones transport supplies to the front lines and evacuate casualties to first aid stations and field hospitals. The growing number of Ukrainian drone systems was developed based on feedback from frontline troops. These ideas were rapidly implemented due to wartime urgency.

In 2024, Ukraine established a new military branch, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Force, separate from the Ukrainian Air Force, which operates manned aircraft. This Drone Force does not control the drones regularly used by Ukrainian forces but focuses on developing new drone models and organizing mass production for successful designs. These drones have been an unexpected development, significantly impacting how battles in Ukraine’s ongoing war are fought. Their success stems from being affordable, easily modified, and expendable.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have employed inexpensive quadcopter drones, controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away using First Person View (FPV) goggles to see what the drone’s video camera captures. Each drone carries half a kilogram of explosives, enabling it to become a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This is a formidable and debilitating weapon when deployed in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target is stationary or requires more explosive power than the drones can provide, operators can call in artillery, rocket, missile fire, or an airstrike. Larger, fixed-wing drones are used for long-range operations, often over a thousand kilometers, targeting sites deep inside Russia.

These small drones are difficult to shoot down until they are close to the ground and the shooter is within a few hundred meters, close enough to target a drone with a bullet or two. Troops are rarely positioned to do this, so most drones complete their missions, whether one-way attacks or reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. Reconnaissance missions are typically survivable, allowing drones to be reused. Both sides deploy enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over portions of the frontline, extending several kilometers into enemy territory. Ukrainian drones have largely halted Russian motorized transport within 20–30 kilometers of the front lines.

The widespread use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, with both sides producing as many as possible. Ukrainian drone proliferation began with individuals and small teams designing and building drones, which served as candidates for widespread use and mass production. This diversity of designers and manufacturers led to rapid advancements in drone capabilities and applications. Less effective designs resulted in higher combat losses.

One countermeasure, electronic jamming of drone control signals, is effective only temporarily. Drone guidance systems are continually modified or upgraded to counter jamming, often using multiple communication modes. Most drones have flight control software that returns them to their launch point for landing if their control signals are jammed. Jammers, located on the ground, can be targeted by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures are constantly overcome, and the side that adapts more quickly gains a temporary advantage. Both sides invest heavily in keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.

Western armed forces, despite a century of efforts, still struggle to align air force perspectives with ground realities where battles and wars are decided. Meanwhile, the proliferation of surveillance and armed drones has, in many cases, replaced conventional air forces, particularly for operations close to the ground that require urgent target identification and engagement.

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