The Tsar’s Balkan Wars

Conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was a mainstay of the Eastern Mediterranean world for over one hundred and fifty years, a series of wars that are often addressed as part of broader European histories, but rarely studied on their own merits. Victor Taki delves deeply into one aspect of these conflicts in Russia’s Turkish Wars. In this case, it should be noted that the focus of Taki’s work is the book’s subtitle, The Tsarist Army and the Balkan Peoples in the Nineteenth Century, as he seeks primarily to “reconstruct the intellectual and cultural factors that informed the policies of the tsarist command with regard to different groups of the Balkan population,” and argues that “the contrasting choices and decisions of the Russian commanders and strategists in 1828-9 and 1877-8 reflected a reconceptualization of the role of the people in the war that took place in the long nineteenth century” (p. 6).

The construct of the narrative itself is a combination of chronology and period Russian theory on the conduct of a “people’s war,” although Taki is careful to distinguish the Russian concept of that term with other, similar-though-not-identical, forms of nineteenth century warfare such as guerrilla, partisan, or small war. In this context, the demographic breakdown of the region between Christian and Muslim population groups is, of course, of central importance. The opening three chapters set up this paradigm in a rather straightforward manner, with a discussion first of the background to the war of 1828-9, discussion of the war itself, and the subsequent theoretical development in Russian strategic planning efforts, most prominently demonstrated by I.P. Liprandi. During this era, the focus for Russia was primarily on the avoidance, or at least the minimization, of the onset and influence of such a people’s war on the handling of overall strategic concerns.

Chapters four and five deal with the conduct and aftermath of the Crimean War which, for Taki, does not hold as great importance as do the other conflicts that bookend the era. The significance of this period results from an awareness of the growing importance of popular attitude in the region toward political concerns. Such influence, then, factored increasingly for Russian leaders on incorporating these popular attitudes – particularly in the Bulgarian regions of Ottoman Europe – into Russian war planning.

Chapters six and seven evaluate Russian action in the final conflict, considered that of 1877-8, where ethnic and confessional antagonism was much more pronounced between Christian and Muslim, and where Russian commanders and leaders had to increasingly plan for the incorporation of popular attitudes and actions into their operations and post-conflict occupation plans. The conflict also saw progressively well-armed local militia and paramilitary groups, which added another dimension to the overall operating landscape. Taki emphasizes the growing socio-political complexity of the era, but also the fact that many of these challenges both led to and were caused by a growing Russian antagonism toward Muslim populations in the region.

Taki’s overall conclusions are more nuanced than categorical. He emphasizes the general consistency of Russian war planning considerations in the hesitancy to fully incorporate popular action into any conflict, while at the same time noting increasing Russian recognition of the reality of such involvement as part and parcel of any regional conflict. The Russian response to popular action was not always consistent, but merits neither unmitigated praise for the defense and salvation of the Balkan Christian population nor unremitting condemnation for persecution, massacre and subjugation of corresponding Muslim peoples. The truth, to Taki, is much more complicated, and greatly dependent on time, place and circumstance as to the degree to which any assertions can be applied.

There are many strengths to this work, and for the student of Russian nineteenth century military history or the scholar of nineteenth-century and/or irregular conflict studies, Taki’s work contains many insights and intriguing contributions. Russia’s Turkish Wars, though, is not necessarily the most appropriate work for those with a limited understanding of the Russian-Ottoman conflicts or irregular warfare history in general. Taki is looking at more advanced concepts here, and one needs to have a firm understanding of not only the events of the era, but what terminology and doctrine looked like during the period in question, particularly with the consistent use, and clear importance, of contemporary concepts (such as people’s war, or other alternative conflict types of the era). For those with a firm foundation in those areas, though, there is much value in Russia’s Turkish Wars.

---///---

Our Reviewer: Dr. Michael Boden teaches global and Civil War history at Dutchess Community College in Poughkeepsie, NY. A retired Army Veteran, he is a former Assistant Professor of History at West Point, and is on the Board of Trustees of the Dutchess County Historical Society, where he is currently researching the history of the county's Soldiers in the Civil War. He previously reviewed Such a Clash of Arms: The Maryland Campaign, September 1862 and No Sacrifice too Great.

---///---

Note: Russia’s Turkish Wars is also available in e-editions.

StrategyPage reviews are published in cooperation with The New York Military Affairs Symposium

www.nymas.org