The Creation of the U.S. Army's Amphibious Capability in the European Theatre.

Did the Army invent the wheel? Or re-invent the wheel? The author very briefly mentions the British Dieppe and St. Nazaire raids, and the Dardanelles Expedition, and might well have mentioned British Belgian Coast Operations of WWI, which considered a landing behind German lines using specialized craft and machines. But none of these matched the scale of the Army landings. The US Navy and Marines had been thinking about amphibious landings for years pre-War, and indeed brought a more sophisticated understanding of these things to the Army – which often refused to listen. But the Army’s hubris was based not only in overconfidence in its wrong ideas, but in its readiness in 1942 to do such a massive job with no experience.

It was infinitely fortunate for the Army that Churchill and the British had appropriately cold feet about landing in France in 1942. Their “Mediterranean Strategy” gave the Americans four crucial test runs where a vast amount was learned from partial failings, but without disaster. Overlord in 1944 could hardly have succeeded without the test runs and real combat experience of Torch, Husky, Anvil, and Shingle.

Yet this overconfidence reveals a great deal about the psychology of the US Army over the course of its history. From the Revolution to Korea, the US Army shrank to a small professional cadre in peacetime, but learned to expand overnight to a huge force of largely amateur officers and conscript soldiers – the possession of the material resources and a generally very well-educated and highly motivated population made this possible.

The institutional memory of organizing this expanded manpower was joined with the partnership with American industry that the cadre pursued between the wars to develop its air and mechanized arms. The Army had thought relatively little about amphibious warfare during this period, but was institutionally ready to jump into the problem, with the1942 “Sledgehammer” invasion of France as its immediate goal. Luckily for us, American deficiencies and British skepticism intervened.

Operation Torch followed. It was an overall success coupled with numerous failures in detail, like the other landings leading up to Normandy. It was our good fortune to be opposed by the Vichy French, who offered real but irresolute armed resistance. As Patton said at the time, if our opponent had been the Germans, we would have failed. What went wrong? First, the landings themselves were chaos. Getting the troops into the landing craft was painful and slow. The skills of landing craft crews and cargo-handling beach crews were seriously deficient. The LST was not available yet, so landing tanks on the beach was impossible. Supporting paratroop drops were a total failure – the planes got lost. Very fortunately, they had Navy carrier air support – the USAAF didn’t believe in close ground support. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) was vital, but the Army opposed preliminary naval bombardments as costing the element of surprise. It was an essential learning experience; the chaos on the beaches was a serious shock, but training and experience produced only a slow but steady improvement. And it took much longer for the Army and the Air force to grasp the fact that some of their cherished concepts were dead wrong.

Torch was followed with much training and reflection, but US amphibious forces still had a long way to go. After the defeat of Rommel in North Africa the decision was taken to invade Sicily, in pursuit of the British priority of knocking Italy out of the War. This time the major failure was air support. There were no carriers and naval air, and the USAAF still refused to do close air support, sticking to the interdiction and strategic bombing it believed in. The Air Force also failed to understand the proper use of fighters and fighter direction, and so did not provide control of the air over the landing force. The Luftwaffe operated freely, and so when the supporting paratroop drop strayed over the landing force, it was met with concentrated anti-aircraft fire that cost heavy losses. Meanwhile NSFS was not permitted a preliminary bombardment, but still drove the Italian Army from its beach defenses. Counterattacks by German armor threatened to wipe out the beachhead, but 105 howitzers and Sherman tanks landed by the new LST’s stopped them, and naval gunfire pursued them as they fled, decimating them. Finally the value of naval gunfire was appreciated, if still not completely understood, as will be seen.

The landings at Salerno and assault on the Italian mainland did, in fact, produce an armistice with Italy. Amphibious execution was better, but German resistance was far stronger, six divisions. General Clark considered withdrawal. “As the German forces counterattacked, the Fifth Army commander prepared for the removal of the corps in a kind of mini-Dunkirk”. Adm. Hewitt protested that such an operation would be highly complex and dangerous, and indeed, massive naval gunfire engaged and smashed the German armor.

The peninsular terrain was highly defensible, and Clarke’s army found itself stalemated at the Gustav Line. This led to Shingle, the Anzio landing in Jan. 1944, an attempt to turn the flank of the Gustav Line. Curatola’s explanation for the controversial failure for the Allies to move out of the beachhead is that the landing was made in insufficient force to cut the German supply lines from Rome. Such was the strength of the Gustav Line, the Germans were able to move superior forces against Anzio. His view – it was Mark Clark’s indecision that doomed Anzio from the start.

Suffice it to say, the Normandy landings in June were a masterpiece of organization, technological invention, and well thought-out tactics; it would not have been possible without the two years of trial runs and real battle experience. The Air Force finally understood its role, and the Army understood naval gunfire’s role. The latter was criticized for not taking out German strong points in its preliminary bombardment, but these require a direct hit with an AP shell, where high explosive shells against troops and vehicles in motion are devastating.

In the four previous landings, the US was fortunate in having overwhelming superiority in force and materiel (except at Anzio) to enable it to win in spite of inexperience and many serious failures in detail. The flawed confidence this engendered lasted up until Vietnam – or maybe it’s still part of the American psyche. Some will disagree, and if this reviewer appears to accept many of Curatola’s judgments on controversial issues, I can only say I am convinced by his thorough research and cogent analysis.

Armies Afloat, a volume in the UPK series “Modern War Studies,” is fine history and required reading for all students of amphibious warfare, the US Army, and WWII.

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Our Reviewer: Robert P. Largess is the author of USS Albacore; Forerunner of the Future, and articles on the USS Triton, SS United States, the origin of the towed sonar array, and the history of Lighter-than-Air. He has contributed book reviews to ‘The Naval Historical Foundation’ (http://www.navyhistory.org) and The International Journal of Naval History (http://www.ijnhonline.org). His earlier reviews here include The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, King Arthur’s Wars: The Anglo-Saxon Conquest of England, Clouds above the Hill: A Historical Novel of the Russo-Japanese War, Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War, The Fate of Rome, "Tower of Skulls", A History of the Asia-Pacific War, Volume I: From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the Fall of Corregidor, July 1937-May 1942, Nathanhttps://www.strategypage.com/bookreviews/2783iel Lyon’s River Campaign of 1861, Korea: War without End, Exterminating ISIS, and Admiral Canaris. 

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Note: Armies Afloat is also available in e-editions.

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