November 4, 2025: The 1922 Russian invasion of Ukraine was the first major war between industrialized nations since World War II ended in 1945. Russia expected a quick and easy victory, as invaders often do. They underestimated the ability of the Ukrainians to stop the invaders and eventually push the Russians out. Successfully defending their homeland required speedy and successful innovation. One of those enhancements was the use of fishing nets to protect valuable vehicles, positions or movement routes from drone attack. This year the Ukrainians began widespread use of nets to protect military positions, vehicles and routes from drone attack.

Previously metal nets or rolls of fencing were used to protect vehicles from drones. This was more expensive than fabric fishing nets and added more weight to the vehicle. These nets are still used but the Ukrainians realized that nylon fishing nets are cheaper, lighter and more rapidly deployed to snare the propellers of attacking drones and demobilize them. Some of these enemy drones were still largely intact and could be modified to become Ukrainian drones. Many drones snagged in nets are shot a few times with rifles or pistols but many are simply rendered useless by the nets.

The Russians were the first in 2023 to use fishing nets for protection, but they did not expand their use of nets significantly. In 2024 Russian troops could be seen putting nets over some movement routes and, once more, did not use this technique widely. This year the Ukrainians have rapidly expanded their use of nets and the Russians are trying to catch up.

Modern warfare has been radically changed by the introduction of First Person View/FPV. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the video camera on the drone to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their quadcopter FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, the drone operators often operate in pairs with one flying behind the other and concentrating on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When such a target is found by the reconnaissance drone, the armed drone is directed to the target. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they can spend more time in the air to seek a target.

The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022 when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023 the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. By early 2024, there were over 40,000 Russian FPV drone attacks and the Russians kept video records of each one. Only twelve percent of those attacks led to the destruction of the target, which could be a vehicle or group of infantry or even a sniper who was firing through a window from inside a building. In this case the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense from this was having a nearby open door the sniper could run to or dive through as the FPV drone approached. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it until it’s too late.

Several million drones are being built this year. The total for 2024 was 1.5 million drones and this year production will nearly double. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up and, this year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States and elsewhere were quickly found. At least 70 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, and the rest from imported parts or whole assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For the FPV First Person View drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered a form of ammunition.

Both sides now use the FPV drones but there are substantial differences on how the FPV drones, are put to work in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian trucks carrying supplies are another prime target.

This new threat had led to work on improved defensive measures. First priority goes to Electronic Counter Measures/ECM systems which armored vehicles, trucks and even troops on foot require to survive FPV drone attacks. There is another problem when the attacker changes the control frequencies their drone use for effective remote control. This is more of a problem for Russian defenders than Ukrainian as the Russians are controlled by slow bureaucratic leaders and production systems while the Ukrainians are much more flexible. Many FPV drones have backup systems for these situations that include returning to the launch site or completing an attack on a target that has been sighted and the FPV drone is already headed for. This means the range of the defensive ECM signal must be more than 100 meters to avoid getting hit by a FPV drone programmed to continue heading for the target if its control signal was jammed or lost because of FPV drone equipment failure.

Another requirement for adequate defense is the presence of metal screens or grills to defeat FPV drone attacks that get past the protective ECM signals. Note that the thinnest armor is over areas on the top side of the tank, particularly the turret and especially behind the turret, where the engine is. Damage the engine so that the tank can no longer move, and the suddenly immobile target becomes easier to destroy. Tank crews will often abandon their immobile vehicle. Then there are additional effective protective measures for vehicles. These include Barbeque and Bubbles structures erected over tanks and other armored vehicles to halt or diminish the impact of drone attacks.